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Abstract: 
The present research examined the reliability of three types of divergent thinking tasks (unusual 
uses, instances, consequences/implications) and two types of subjective scoring (an average 
across all responses vs. the responses people chose as their top-two responses) within a latent 
variable framework, using the maximal-reliability H statistic. Overall, the unusual uses tasks 
performed the best for both scoring types, the instances tasks had less reliable scores, and the 
consequences tasks had poor reliability and convergence problems. The discussion considers 
implications for test users, differences between average scoring and top-two scoring, and the 
problem of whether divergent thinking tasks are interchangeable. 
creativity | divergent thinking | measurement | reliability | latent variable models | Keywords: 
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Article: 
Divergent thinking tasks, for better or worse, are among the most widely used tools to measure 
creativity (Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008), particularly the ability to generate creative ideas 
(Silvia et al., 2008). As open-ended tasks, they present researchers with an almost paralyzing 
number of possibilities for scoring, and the decades of research on divergent thinking have 
provided many ways of creating tidy numerical scores from people's words and scribbles (see 
Michael and Wright, 1989, Plucker and Renzulli, 1999 and Silvia et al., 2008). For verbal tasks, 
these methods split into two kinds: objective scoring methods (e.g., Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and 
subjective scoring methods (e.g., Silvia et al., 2008 and Silvia et al., 2009a). The objective 
methods have been extensively studied and form the basis of the best-known assessment 
approaches, such as Wallach and Kogan's (1965) tasks and the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking (Torrance, 2008). Subjective methods, in contrast, have received less attention, 
probably because they take more research resources (Silvia, Martin, et al., 2009) and because 
researchers often confuse “objective” with “valid” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 
1966). 
To expand the growing literature on subjective scoring, the present research examines the score 
reliability of subjective scoring approaches. Reliability is fundamental to the enterprise of 
research, and it is essential to understand the reliability of scores generated by new methods. As 
we will see, subjective scoring methods require different approaches to estimating reliability, 
particularly methods that separate variance due to traits and to raters. After considering the 
estimation of reliability within latent variable models, we estimate the reliability of two 
subjective scoring approaches for three kinds of divergent thinking tasks. 
 
1. The reliability of subjective ratings 
Using subjective ratings complicates the ordinarily simple issue of estimating reliability. Because 
more than one rater ought to be used (Silvia et al., 2008), using raters adds a facet to the model: 
the researcher will have several divergent thinking tasks, each scored by several raters. The 
problem is that the raters’ scores are not independent: scores from one rater are more likely to be 
more similar to scores from that rater than from other raters, so ignoring the rater facet (such as 
by treating each rater as an independent item in a Cronbach's alpha analysis) will yield 
misleading estimates of reliability. 
 
The dependence of the raters’ scores can be modeled with latent variable methods, such as the 
multitrait–multimethod confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model shown in Fig. 1. Each 
divergent thinking task is represented by a latent variable with raters’ scores as the indicators, 
and the dependence of the raters’ scores is represented with covariances between the residual 
variances. This CFA model nicely depicts the study's measurement structure, but it takes the 
estimation of reliability outside of the realm of Cronbach's alpha computed on observed scores. 
Furthermore, researchers may wish to specify measurement models for which traditional 
reliability estimates cannot be applied. For example, if researchers have many tasks, they can 
estimate a higher-order latent variable that represents the construct that explains why the tasks 
covary, such as a higher-order Creativity variable (e.g., Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & 
O’Connor, 2009). One would like to know the reliability of the higher-order construct, but its 
indicators are themselves latent variables, not observed scores. 
 
Fig. 1. Depiction of a CFA model that includes several divergent thinking tasks and several 
raters. 
When using subjective ratings, researchers thus need an estimate of reliability that is suitable for 
latent variable models. Latent variable modeling is a sophisticated way of modeling error, such 
as error variance due to raters, but it does not absolve researchers of the need to consider the 
reliability of assessment. One might argue that this need is greater in creativity research, which 
faces the task of measuring a truly complicated construct. 
For latent variables, reliability can be estimated with coefficient H, known as construct 
reliability (Hancock & Mueller, 2001) and maximal reliability ( Drewes, 2000 and Raykov, 
2004). H can be understood, according toHancock and Mueller (2001), as the “proportion of 
variability in the construct explainable by its own indicator variables” (pp. 202–203). If the 
latent variable were regressed on its predictors, H would represent the model'sR2, the percentage 
of variance that the predictors (the indicators) explain in the outcome (the latent variable). 
The value of H for a latent variable with k indicators and standardized loadings a is defined by 
 
For example, a latent variable with four indicators with standardized loadings of .90, .85, .80, 
and .75 yields an H = .91. 
Specifically,H = (.81/.19) + (.72/.28) + (.64/.36) + (.56/.44)/1 + [(.81/.19) + (.72/.28) + (.64/.36) 
+ (.56/.44)] = .91. 
Coefficient H has some useful properties for estimating reliability for latent variables. First, the 
sign of the indicator loading is immaterial to H because each indicator's standardized weight is 
squared. Some reliability coefficients require that all indicators have the same sign (e.g., 
Cronbach's alpha), but the direction of a relationship in psychology is often due to arbitrary 
scoring decisions. In a CFA model of creativity, for example, researchers would expect an 
indicator that captures “conventionality” to have a negative loading. 
Second, H will never be lower than the reliability of the most reliable indicator. As a result, 
adding indicators will always increase H provided that they have non-zero loadings. This 
contrasts with many measures of reliability, such as Cronbach's alpha, which decline when 
weaker indicators are added. In the earlier example, for instance, the indicator with the loading of 
.90 has a reliability of .902, or .81, which is lower than the H of .91. This property of H stems 
from the assumption in latent variable modeling that adding indicators always adds additional 
information about the construct (see Hancock & Mueller, 2001). Stated differently, a latent 
variable cannot convey less information than its most informative indicator. If it did, then it 
would paradoxically be better to use the observed indicator instead of the latent variable. 
Because a model's H would not be lower than its best indicator, H will generally be higher than 
Cronbach's alpha. To understand the relationship between alpha and H, we can develop an 
empirical example. Consider a study that administered six divergent thinking tasks and used 
fluency (the number of responses) as the measure of creativity, which is common in divergent 
thinking research. The present study, not by coincidence, administered six tasks, and Cronbach's 
alpha for the fluency scores (estimated via SPSS with ordinary least-squares) was .802. To obtain 
alpha via a CFA, we specify the six scores as indicators of a single latent variable, and we 
specify that the standardized loadings are tau-equivalent (i.e., constrained to be equal). For this 
CFA, the H value (estimated via Mplus with maximum-likelihood) was H = .802, an identical 
estimate. To estimate maximal reliability, we simply drop the tau-equivalence constraint, which 
allows each indicator to have a unique loading. For this CFA, the H value was .851, a higher 
value. H thus contains alpha as a special case. 
 
Like alpha, then, H is a function of the number of indicators and the size of their loading; unlike 
alpha, H does not constrain the loadings to be tau-equivalent, and it will increase as indicators 
are added. In applied research, similar standards and cut-offs are used to judge the acceptability 
of an H value, such as a level of .70 or .80. 
 
2. The present research 
The versatility of H makes it ideal for creativity research, which will often need complex CFA 
models to represent designs with several facets, such as task types, raters, and time points. In the 
present research, I considered the reliability of two types of subjective scoring for three types of 
tasks. The first scoring method, known simply as average scoring, asks raters to score each 
response to a task and then averages the scores—all responses thus contribute to the score. The 
second scoring method, known as top-two scoring, asks participants to pick their two responses 
that they think are their most creative. The raters’ scores of these top-two responses are averaged 
for an overall score (Silvia et al., 2008). Both scoring methods have fared well in research, but 
the top-two approach generally has larger effect sizes, probably because it omits the mundane 
responses that everyone generates ( Silvia et al., 2008 and Silvia et al., 2009b). 
 
Both scoring methods were applied to three types of tasks: unusual uses tasks (generating 
creative uses for common objects), instances tasks (generating creative examples from a 
common category), and consequences tasks (generating creative implications of a hypothetical 
event). It is important to consider several task types because it is currently controversial whether 
different kinds of tasks are interchangeable (Almeida et al., 2008, Clapham, 2004 and Kuhn and 
Holling, 2009). Stated differently, divergent thinking tasks may be fixed rather than random, so 
researchers may not be willing to generalize across tasks. It seems likely that some kinds of 
divergent thinking tasks recruit different skills, strategies, or knowledge, so it is important to 
understand the reliability of assessment for several kinds of tasks. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 226 undergraduates (178 women, 48 men) who took part in the 
Creativity and Cognition Project, a study of creativity, personality, and intelligence. Most of the 
students were 18 or 19 years old (82%), and less than 3% had declared psychology as a major. 
Nursing (31%) was the most prevalent major, followed by undecided (11%) and biology (5%). 
 
3.2. Method 
People completed six divergent thinking tasks: two Unusual Uses tasks (unusual uses for a brick 
and for a knife), two Instances tasks (instances of things that are round and that make a noise), 
and two Consequences tasks (consequences of not needing to sleep and of everyone shrinking to 
12 in. in height). The tasks were completed in the following order: brick, round, sleep, knife, 
noise, and inches. For each task, people were told that it concerned creativity and that they ought 
to try to be creative. Not all divergent thinking assessment uses “be creative” instructions, but 
research shows that instructing respondents to be creative increases the validity of divergent 
thinking scores (e.g., Harrington, 1975 and Katz and Poag, 1979). 
 
People had three minutes to complete each task. After the task, they were asked to read their 
responses and then circle the two that they thought were their best. By asking people to choose 
their two most creative responses, we can use a kind of maximal assessment: people are asked to 
be creative and then judged based on the creativity of their best responses (cf. Runco, 1986). 
 
Three undergraduates independently rated each response. The responses were transcribed into a 
spreadsheet and then sorted alphabetically within task prior to scoring, so the raters were 
unaware of the person's other responses, whether a response was chosen as a top-two response, 
idiosyncratic information available from the hard copies (e.g., handwriting), and the scores given 
by the other raters. Each response was rated on a 1–5 scale (1 = not at all creative, 5 = very 
creative). 
 
We examined two scoring methods. For average scoring, each response receives a rating, and the 
average across a rater's score for the task serves as the final score. Average scoring thus uses all 
of the responses. For top-two scoring, only the rater's scores for the two responses chosen as the 
best are included; the average across a rater's scores for the top-two responses serves as the final 
score. As a result, top-two scoring is based on far fewer responses—across all 6 tasks, 
approximately 25% of the 10,749 usable responses were chosen as top-two responses.1 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the six tasks for each scoring method. All models 
were estimated with Mplus 6.0, using full-information maximum-likelihood with robust standard 
errors. For each type of task, I specified the confirmatory factor model depicted in Fig. 1. This 
kind of multitrait–multimethod model—known as a correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model 
(Brown, 2006 and Lance et al., 2002)—represents rater-specific variability by allowing each 
rater's residual variances to covary. Ratings are thus a function of people's task score (the latent 
task variable) and rater-specific features (the residual covariance). Six CFA models were 
estimated: one for each task type (unusual uses, instances, consequences) and for each scoring 
type (average scoring, top-two scoring). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the six divergent thinking tasks. 
 M Mdn SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Brick: 
average 
1.68 1.67 .30 1            
2. Knife: 
average 
1.76 1.72 .34 .449 1           
 M Mdn SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
3. Round: 
average 
1.43 1.33 .31 .194 .170 1          
4. Noise: 
average 
1.35 1.31 .20 .137 .208 .178 1         
5. No 
sleep: 
average 
1.52 1.50 .27 .127 .145 .109 .111 1        
6. 12 in. 
tall: 
average 
1.39 1.38 .23 .152 .292 .091 .234 .269 1       
7. Brick: 
top two 
1.89 1.83 .47 .745 .332 .117 .093 .137 .139 1      
8. Knife: 
top two 
1.94 1.83 .47 .332 .782 .176 .167 .028 .199 .228 1     
9. Round: 
top two 
1.57 1.50 .46 .178 .099 .731 .098 .151 .080 .194 .148 1    
10. Noise: 
top two 
1.45 1.33 .33 .134 .109 .174 .678 .202 .245 .118 .138 .152 1   
11. No 
sleep: top 
two 
1.58 1.50 .40 .114 .110 .141 .131 .721 .255 .106 .059 .117 .180 1  
12. 12 in. 
tall: top 
two 
1.47 1.33 .36 .080 .176 .005 .222 .235 .741 .020 .146 .003 .235 .189 1 
Note: Scores are averaged across the three raters. The raw data and complete correlation matrix are available from the author. 
 
4.1. Unusual uses tasks 
The CFA models for the unusual uses tasks fit well—Table 2 displays the fit statistics. For 
average scoring, the standardized loadings for the three raters were β = .933, .807, and .423 for 
the Brick task and β = .863, .868, and .473 for the Knife task, yielding H values of .90 and .86 
(see Table 3). The residual correlations for the raters were small—βs for the three raters were −
.285, .08, and .084—so rater-specific influences on the scores were modest. 
Table 2. Model fit for the confirmatory factor analyses. 
 χ2 CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Unusual uses: average scoring 6.75 (p = .24) .996 .039 .023 
Unusual uses: top-two scoring 8.78 (p = .12) .985 .058 .030 
Instances: average scoring 6.56 (p = .25) .981 .037 .030 
Instances: top-two scoring 4.59 (p = .47) .999 .001 .026 
Consequences: average scoring 10.17 (p = .25) .985 .035 .034 
 χ2 CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Consequences: top-two scoring – – – – 
Note: Empty cells indicate that the model did not converge to an admissible solution. 
Table 3. Construct reliability for the divergent thinking tasks. 
 Average scoring Top-two scoring 
Unusual uses: brick .90 .75 
Unusual uses: knife .86 .79 
Instances: round .64 .63 
Instances: noise .74 .59 
Consequences: no sleep .71 .66 
Consequences: 12 in. tall .87 – 
Note: Values are H scores. Empty cells indicate that the model did not converge to an admissible 
solution. 
For top-two scoring, the loadings for the three raters were β = .763, .755, and .475 for the Brick 
task andβ = .719, .833, and .492 for the Knife task, yielding H values of .75 and .79 (see Table 
3). The residual correlations for the raters were near zero—βs for the three raters were −.007, 
.019, and −.018—so rater-specific influences on the scores were tiny. 
4.2. Instances tasks 
The CFA models for the instances tasks fit well—Table 2 displays the fit statistics. For average 
scoring, the loadings for the three raters were β = .636, .629, and .554 for the Round task 
and β = .835, .359, and .520 for the Noise task, yielding H values of .64 and .74 (see Table 3). 
The residual correlations for the raters wereβ = .035, .218, and .192, so rater-specific influences 
on the scores were again modest. 
For top-two scoring, the loadings for the three raters were β = .672, .627, and .427 for the 
Round task andβ = .723, .190, and .468 for the Noise task, yielding H values of .63 and .59 
(see Table 3). The residual correlations for the raters were β = −.224, .164, and .142, so rater-
specific influences on the scores were modest. 
4.3. Consequences tasks 
Unlike the unusual uses and instances tasks, the consequences tasks posed problems with model 
convergence to an admissible solution. For average scoring, the CFA converged when the three 
correlations between residual variances were omitted. The model fit of this CFA is shown 
in Table 2. The loadings for the three raters were β = .697, .768, and .293 for the Sleep factor 
and β = .562, .931, and .172 for the Inches factor, yielding H values of .71 and .87 (see Table 
3). 
5. General discussion 
5.1. Reliability across tasks and scoring methods 
Reliability is fundamental to assessment, so it is important to understand the features of the 
scores developed by new assessment methods. The present research examined the reliability of 
scores from two scoring methods for three kinds of divergent thinking tasks. Using H, an 
estimate of construct quality that is suitable for complex latent variable models ( Hancock and 
Mueller, 2001 and Raykov, 2004), the analyses revealed findings with clear implications for 
researchers interested in subjective scoring methods. 
 
First, regarding scoring methods, average scoring was generally more reliable than top-two 
scoring (see Table 2). This is not surprising, given that average scores are based on all of the 
responses, whereas top-two scores for a task are based on only two responses. Average scores 
would thus be expected to be more stable. A similar finding appeared in a small-sample 
generalizability analysis (Silvia et al., 2008, Study 1): average scoring yielded scores that were 
somewhat more reliable than top-two scoring. Because both methods use the same data—the top-
two scores are a subset of the average scores—it would be natural for researchers to use and 
report both methods. 
 
Second, regarding tasks, reliability levels differed substantially across the tasks. On the one end, 
the unusual uses tasks performed the best overall. For both scoring methods, the unusual uses 
tasks yielded H values that are suitable for basic research. The instances tasks were intermediate: 
the models converged, but the H levels were notably lower than the unusual uses tasks. These 
tasks are perhaps not so poor to recommend against their use, but more work is needed before 
they could be recommended with confidence. One the other end, the consequences tasks 
performed poorly. For both scoring methods, the multitrait–multimethod CFA shown in Fig. 1 
would not converge to an admissible solution. A tweaked model worked for average scoring, but 
no suitable model would converge for top-two scoring. 
 
Discussions with the raters for this data set and an earlier data set (Silvia et al., 2008, Study 1) 
revealed that the consequences task was the hardest to score. Participants commonly gave 
contradictory responses—for the Sleep task, for example, many people wrote “It would take 
longer to finish college,” many more people wrote “People could finish college faster,” and some 
people bizarrely wrote both responses—and the overall creativity ratings were near the floor of 
the scale. Raters also noted that it was hard to appraise the cleverness and unusualness of 
responses to events that could never happen. Given the present findings, subjective scoring 
methods for consequences tasks cannot be recommended. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that these results should not be taken out of their assessment context, 
such as the instructions and timing parameters for the tasks. For example, we asked participants 
to try to come up with creative responses, and most divergent thinking research does not do this. 
Likewise, research is inconsistent in the use of timed versus untimed tasks. Different studies may 
use the same tasks, but orienting participants to creativity and asking them to pick their most 
creative responses makes the assessment approach different. To evaluate how such factors affect 
reliability, researchers with many datasets could combine them as part of a reliability 
generalization study, which examines how score reliability differs across samples, contexts, and 
task features (Vacha-Haase, 1998). Creativity research has been criticized over the years for the 
quality of its assessment, and employing sophisticated approaches to reliability estimation would 
help address such criticisms. 
 
Similarly, we should note that average scoring and top-two scoring have some important 
differences. They stem from the same assessment method, but they probably capture different 
sides of divergent thinking. In particular, top-two scoring asks for people's self-assessment of 
their most creative responses. As a result, both generative and evaluative aspects of creative 
thought influence people's scores. Not surprisingly, research shows that people's top-two 
judgments covary strongly with the raters’ judgments: people seem capable of discerning their 
better ideas from their worse ideas (Silvia, 2008b). But some people's top-two judgments 
covaried more strongly than others’ judgments did, consistent with the notion that creative 
evaluation is a skill that varies between people (Grohman et al., 2006 and Sternberg, 2006). 
Interestingly, we have consistently found that top-two scoring yields higher effect sizes than 
average scoring (Silvia et al., 2008, Study 2; Silvia, Nusbaum, et al., 2009) and snapshot scoring, 
a simple holistic scoring method (Silvia, Martin, et al., 2009). 
 
Broadly speaking, the aim of this program of work is to explore new methods for scoring 
divergent thinking, not to argue for a single method. Top-two scoring in particular is 
controversial (see Baer, 2008, Kim, 2008 and Runco, 2008), but the validity of psychological 
assessment is largely an empirical question. Divergent thinking research primarily uses scoring 
methods proposed in the 1960s, so creativity researchers, if anyone, ought to find value in 
exploring novel scoring methods and statistical models. 
 
 
5.2. Are types of divergent thinking tasks interchangeable? 
Divergent thinking research commonly administers many kinds of tasks and then combines the 
scores, such as by averaging or summing. The tasks can be diverse: many kinds of verbal tasks 
have been used, and the verbal and figural classes themselves capture different facets of 
creativity. An issue, however, is whether researchers should be willing to view divergent 
thinking tasks as interchangeable and equivalent. Scores from one kind of task may not be 
equivalent from scores from other kinds: the tasks might capture different facets of creativity or 
different knowledge, strategies, and abilities needed for successful task performance. 
 
Recent work has highlighted differences between tasks. In a small-sample generalizability 
analysis of three tasks (one unusual uses, one instances, and one consequences task), Silvia et al. 
(2008, Study 1) found that the tasks appeared to be fixed rather than random, which indicates 
that their scores are not interchangeable. In an analysis of several data sets, Almeida et al. (2008) 
found many differences according to task and method, which again indicates a lack of generality. 
Finally, several studies have found low correlations and salient differences between the verbal 
and figural classes of divergent thinking tasks (e.g., Clapham, 2004 and Kuhn and Holling, 
2009). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that task-specific differences do not necessarily mean that one or 
more kinds of tasks yield invalid scores. Instead, the different task types could be capturing 
different facets and dynamics of creative ideation. Just like a broad construct like intelligence, a 
broad construct like creativity has several layers or facets. At the same time, the task-specific 
features indicate that researchers should be cautious in combining scores from different task 
types and that future work should try to understand the psychological basis of these psychometric 
differences. 
 
The question, then, is was might the psychological basis be? To date, creativity work has not 
generally examined the kinds of abilities and strategies that undergird divergent thinking tasks. 
They have been treated as tests—assessment tools that yield scores—rather than tasks—ways of 
revealing cognitive processes. One could only speculate, but I suspect that executive processes 
are relatively more important in unusual uses tasks, which require people to inhibit accessible, 
obvious uses that interfere with generating novel uses (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 
2007). For instances tasks, in contrast, the kinds of strategies that would create high scores 
probably resemble strategies used in verbal fluency tasks, particularly semantic fluency tasks that 
ask people to enumerate instances of a semantic category (Troyer & Moscovitch, 2006). And for 
consequences tasks, it is hard to say what kinds of strategies would be successful, given that in 
the present work they performed poorly psychometrically. 
 
In short, it seems possible that unusual uses tasks are relatively more executive, whereas 
instances tasks are relatively more associationistic. We would thus expect stronger contributions 
of executive abilities (e.g., fluid intelligence and working memory capacity) to unusual uses 
scores than instances scores, and we would expect different kinds of strategies to be effective. 
The different cognitive bases of the tasks would be one reason why they seem not to generate 
interchangeable scores, but such predictions naturally await future research. 
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